The catalogue.

Nyra's flagship assessment of the 15-paper program: what Maldivian land, homes and rentals are actually worth in July 2026, which segments clear their cost of capital (almost none), what holds prices up anyway — and what every participant, from lender to plot heir, should do about it.

The April 2026 sukuk repayment bought survival, not solvency. With usable reserves below one month of imports, a parallel exchange rate 31–34% above the peg, and banks lending more to the state than to the whole private sector, macro conditions — not housing demand — set land values, build costs and mortgage terms through 2027.

The 2022 census shows a nation converging on Greater Malé at roughly 3,270 new households a year. The last income survey — 2019, still the newest — shows most of those households cannot pay market rents, let alone market prices. The demand side of the housing crisis is a queue, not a market.

Every administration since 1990 has met Greater Malé's congestion with the same two instruments — reclaim land and build state flats — while the 2002 grant system kept allocation political and no price register was ever built. The 2026 cycle is running the same play into a debt-and-dollar wall.

Maldivian real estate runs on a citizens-only freehold core inside a state-leasehold economy. Asset-level taxation is close to zero, tourism land yields the state roughly US$122m a year plus multi-million-dollar tenure fees, and the rules changed ten times in sixteen months.

The capital packs 137,238 people onto 1.95 km² and adds no net supply; the state is deliberately decanting its demand onto reclaimed land. Whether that trade works depends on Hulhumalé becoming an economy, not just a dormitory — and it is at best halfway there.

Greater Malé's lagoons are absorbing roughly 7 times more state-made land than the flagship regional project; Thilafushi gains a port, a power plant and the country's only posted land price, while RasMalé — the largest reclamation ever attempted — remains a financing black box and the regions get infrastructure without people.

There is no transaction register, no price index and no rent index anywhere in the Maldives. The market's entire evidence base is asking prices, rental listings and administered rates — assembled here into per-segment ranges, the reference card for every valuation in this program.

Malé plots are quoted at MVR 7,200–15,000 per square foot, yet an honest residual valuation — completed value minus every cost of building — supports a fraction of that, and is negative in our base case. The gap measures a legal regime in which holding is free, selling is hard, and the highest-value use of prime land is waiting.

Government leases set a MVR 50–54/sqft office benchmark that private landlords cannot match, industrial land has been repriced roughly 25-fold on an unbuilt port thesis, and construction inputs are effectively invoiced at MVR 20.5, not 15.42. A tier-honest map of the least-measured markets in Maldivian real estate.

Four lenders and two state schemes have engineered away the down payment — pension pledges, 5%-equity loans — yet the cheapest formal flat still absorbs half the mean Malé household's income at the best market rate. Mortgage depth near 5% of GDP is the symptom; the price level against incomes is the disease.

India-financed corridor works will finish late but finish; RasMalé's promised 65,000-unit city is reclaimed sand with no financing for anything on top. The measured housing problem, meanwhile, is a bounded Malé deficit inside a much larger affordability gap — and pledged paper supply already exceeds every demand scenario Nyra can construct to 2040.

Seven ten-year strategies modeled on the honest evidence base return 1–9% nominal in the base case — below every quoted lending rate. Debt-service coverage sits under 1.0 across the board, leverage subtracts value in four of the five financeable strategies, and the only routes that clearly pencil are inherited land and USD-indexed rent.

The capstone risk map is hub-and-spoke: ten property risks, and nearly every spoke routes through one over-indebted balance sheet. Climate risk is real but mispriced in time, not direction. The honest forecast to 2030 is a range — asking prices anywhere from −10% to +35%, build costs up in every scenario, and rents the only series that rises in all three.

There is no transaction register, no price index, no rent index, no vacancy count, no consolidated pipeline dataset and no valuation profession — absences confirmed by the World Bank, the IMF and the Housing Ministry itself. This paper inventories what actually exists, prices what the blindness costs, and lays out Nyra's build map for the missing intelligence layer.

An error-correction model finds a real long-run demand relationship in four of six major markets — all strongly income-elastic. The price response, on free annual data, can't be pinned down.

In 2021 China sent 2,000 visitors — down from 300,000. India and Russia filled the gap; by 2025 China was back on top. The Maldives' top-market table has been rewritten three times in six years.

When guesthouses were legalised in 2010 they were a rounding error. Fifteen years on, local-island stays are a sixth of all bednights — the biggest structural change in Maldives tourism since the resort model itself.

A late-February conflict severed the Maldives' Gulf transit hubs, cutting March–April arrivals 20–25%. With connectivity recovering, the underlying growth path resumes — if it holds.