Telecom · Models & scenarios

The models a commercial team would actually run.

Six engines, each with its assumptions on the surface rather than buried in it. Where the public record supports the model it is anchored on observed data; where it does not, the model is labelled as a framework and the missing dataset is named.

The rule applied on this page. Anything anchored on published data says so and cites it. Anything driven by an assumption is marked, and the assumption is a control the reader can move. Nothing simulated is presented as an observation about Ooredoo, Dhiraagu or their customers — a simulated result labelled as real would be worth less than no result at all.

01 — Revenue decomposition

anchored on observed data
Revenue = subscriptions × ARPU

Starting from the market's 2025 position: 808,699 average mobile subscriptions at MVR 325.61 of mobile service revenue per subscription per month. Move the two growth rates and the revenue path follows.

+5.0% a year
2025 actual: +5.2%
-5.0% a year
2025 actual: −4.9%
012502500375050002025+3y+5y
scenario path 2025 revenue held flat
Revenue in 2030
MVR 3,121m
from MVR 3,160m
Revenue CAGR
−0.3%
Subscriptions
1,032,128
penetration would be ~166% of a 620k population
ARPU / month
MVR 251.95
Five-year revenue change by subscription growth and ARPU growth
Revenue change over 5 yearsARPU -8%ARPU -6%ARPU -4%ARPU -2%ARPU 0%ARPU +2%
Subs 0%34%27%18%10%+0%+10%
Subs +2%27%19%10%0%+10%+22%
Subs +4%20%11%1%+10%+22%+34%
Subs +6%12%2%+9%+21%+34%+48%
Subs +8%3%+8%+20%+33%+47%+62%

Base position derived from Ooredoo Maldives and Dhiraagu mobile service revenue (quarterly filings, CMDA InformInvestor) over average monthly mobile subscriptions (Communications Authority of Maldives). The denominator counts SIMs, so this is revenue per active SIM across both operators — not either operator's own reported ARPU, and not revenue per person.

02 — Pricing and elasticity

stated demand model
Pricing simulator — constant-elasticity demand

Q = Q₀ · (P/P₀)ε. Elasticity is an input here, not an estimate.

stated demand model
What this is and is not. No public Maldivian source pairs a prepaid product's price with the number of customers who bought it, so elasticity cannot be estimated from the public record. Estimating it needs operator data: ln(Qt) = α + β·ln(Pt) + controls + ε, fitted on product-level subscription counts across price changes, with promotions and seasonality controlled and the endogeneity of price addressed. β is the elasticity. Everything below is the consequence of assuming a value for it.
MVR 350
e.g. a 28-day data pack
40,000
buyers of this product per cycle
-1.40
elastic — volume responds more than price
MVR 60
incremental network, content and billing cost
MVR 350
0.06.312.518.825.0MVR 105MVR 438MVR 770
revenue gross contribution
Demand at test price
40,000
+0.0% vs today
Revenue
MVR 14m
+0.0% vs today
Gross contribution
MVR 11.6m
Contribution-maximising price
MVR 210
yields MVR 12.27m

With constant elasticity, revenue has no interior maximum — if |ε| > 1 revenue always rises as price falls, and if |ε| < 1 it always rises as price rises. That is a property of the functional form, not of the market, and it is exactly why the contribution optimum (which does exist, because variable cost bites) is the one a commercial team should be looking at.

03 — Customer lifetime value

framework with observed anchors
Customer lifetime value

ARPU is pre-set to the market's 2025 revenue per mobile subscription and margin to the reported EBITDA margin, so the defaults are grounded. Churn, acquisition cost and retention spend are not published by either operator and are the reader's assumptions.

assumption-driven
MVR 326
market average 2025: MVR 326
57%
Ooredoo reported EBITDA margin 2025: 57%
3.0%
not published by either operator
MVR 250
SIM, channel commission, onboarding
MVR 15
12.0% a year
05,00010,00015,00020,0000.5%5.2%10.0%
CLV at current ARPU CLV with ARPU 10% higher
Expected lifetime
33.3 months
2.8 years
Lifetime value (PV)
MVR 4,196
before acquisition cost
CLV net of CAC
MVR 3,946
LTV / CAC
16.8×
above the 3× rule of thumb
CAC payback
1.5 months

The curve is steep at low churn and flat at high churn, which is the practical point: at 6% monthly churn an operator is replacing its base every sixteen months and improving ARPU barely moves lifetime value, while at 2% the same ARPU improvement compounds over four years. Where an operator sits on that curve decides whether the commercial priority is retention or monetisation — and neither Maldivian operator publishes the churn number that would locate them on it.

04 — Churn and retention targeting

simulated base
Retention targeting — churn probability × customer value

A synthetic base of 4,000 prepaid customers, scored by an interpretable logistic model. Choose which customers a fixed retention budget should buy.

simulated data — not observed customers
Simulated, and deliberately so. Every figure in this panel comes from a generated base, not from Ooredoo or Dhiraagu — no operator publishes customer-level records, and inventing a finding from them would be the one thing this project must not do. What is real is the method: the features, the scoring form, and the targeting rule are what an operator would apply to its own CDR, recharge and billing data. To run it for real you would need per-subscriber recharge history, data and voice usage by month, product holdings, tenure, and a defined churn event — 90 days without a revenue-generating event is the usual prepaid definition.
57%
12 months
500
MVR 60
25% of risk removed
the share of at-risk value the offer actually saves
Value protected
MVR 128.6k
expected, before cost
Campaign cost
MVR 30k
Return on the campaign
+329%
Mean churn probability of those contacted
54.2%
Mean monthly spend of those contacted
MVR 294
Top ten customers under the selected targeting policy
CustomerSpend / monthRecharges / monthDays since rechargeTenureData trendChurn probabilityValue at risk
C-2365MVR 4861.04511m65%80%MVR 2,653
C-0765MVR 4190.65225m65%85%MVR 2,442
C-0264MVR 4060.85113m59%85%MVR 2,362
C-0862MVR 4230.55437m52%80%MVR 2,321
C-1281MVR 4161.0514m31%77%MVR 2,201
C-2134MVR 3891.2488m59%83%MVR 2,197
C-1857MVR 4372.05142m65%71%MVR 2,116
C-2382MVR 4070.54721m41%75%MVR 2,087
C-1880MVR 4200.85843m30%72%MVR 2,073
C-1142MVR 4270.75350m43%70%MVR 2,044

Scoring model: logit(p) = -1.15 + 0.055·days-since-recharge − 0.34·recharges-per-month − 0.021·data-trend − 0.018·tenure − 0.0016·spend. Coefficients are stated, not fitted. Switching the policy from value at risk to churn probability raises the average churn probability of the contacted group and lowers the value protected — which is the result the panel exists to show.

05 — Promotion incrementality and cannibalisation

worked example
Promotion: incremental or merely cannibalised?

Two existing products and one promotional price between them. The question is not how many customers took the promotion — it is what they were worth before they took it.

worked example
MVR 300
MVR 400
MVR 350
20,000
45%
30%
70%
MVR 400k
Headline revenue
MVR 7m
what the campaign report would say
Cannibalised
MVR 5.1m
15,000 switchers
Incremental revenue
MVR 1.9m
Incremental contribution
MVR 0.93m
after margin and campaign cost
Genuinely new buyers
5,000
25% of take-up
New buyers needed to break even
1,633
Revenue bridge from headline to incremental contribution
Revenue bridgeCustomersWas worthNow worthEffect
Switched from product A at MVR 3009,000MVR 2.7mMVR 3.15m+MVR 0.45m
Switched from product B at MVR 4006,000MVR 2.4mMVR 2.1mMVR 0.3m
New to the category5,000MVR 1.75m+MVR 1.75m
Incremental revenue20,000MVR 5.1mMVR 7m+MVR 1.9m

Set the promotion below product A's price with most take-up coming from A's existing customers and the incremental line turns negative while the headline stays large. That is the case worth being able to spot before launch, not after: a campaign can grow subscriptions, be reported as a success, and reduce revenue. The one input that decides it — what switchers were spending before — is knowable only from the operator's own pre-period data, which is why a promotion needs a defined control group at design time.

06 — Commercial opportunity ranking

analyst ratings, your weights
Commercial opportunity engine

Nine initiatives, five criteria, weights you set. There is no objectively correct weighting — the value of the exercise is that changing the weights changes the answer visibly, and forces the trade-off to be argued rather than assumed.

analyst ratings
20% weight
20% weight
25% weight
20% weight
15% weight
Opportunity ranking under the chosen weights
InitiativeSize of the prizeUnderlying growthMargin qualityFeasibilityCompetitive headroomScore
01Prepaid-to-postpaid migration4454382
02Retention and reactivation programme4353477
03ARPU defence on the core data pack5254275
Stop the erosion in revenue per subscription by re-laddering the mid-tier data packs rather than adding volume to them.
Evidence: Mobile revenue was flat in 2025 (+0.1%) while subscriptions grew 5.2%: revenue per subscription fell 4.9%.
04Visitor and short-stay monetisation3444373
05Portfolio simplification3145468
06Migrant-worker segment4334368
07Entertainment and gaming bundles3434368
08Fixed broadband expansion4343266
09Enterprise and resort connectivity4342262

Ratings are on a 1–5 scale and are analyst judgements, not measurements; the evidence line under each initiative says what the judgement rests on. Score = Σ(rating/5 × weight) ÷ Σweights, expressed out of 100. Under any weighting that puts meaningful value on margin quality, ARPU defence and retention rank at or near the top — which is the finding, not the formula.

Customer segmentation — the framework, not a finding

There is no customer-level public data, and this section does not invent any. What follows is the segmentation an operator could build from data it already holds, the fields each dimension needs, and what each segment should be worth doing about. Segment sizes are deliberately absent: guessing them would be the difference between a framework and a fabrication.
The RFM-plus dimensions and what each requires
Dimension Definition Source system
Recency Days since the last revenue-generating event Recharge and usage records
Frequency Recharges and pack purchases per month Recharge records
Monetary Rolling three-month spend Billing records
Engagement Data volume, voice minutes, app mix, trend in each Network usage records (CDR/xDR)
Tenure Months since activation Subscriber master
Portfolio Which products held, and how that has changed Product subscription records

Implementation: score each subscriber on each dimension over a rolling window, cluster or rule-band the scores, and re-run monthly so a customer can move between segments — a segmentation that never moves is a label, not a behaviour.

Eight segments and the action each implies
Segment Spend Behavioural signature Commercial action
High value Top decile of monthly spend Frequent recharges, high data, long tenure Protect. Proactive service, early access, no discount needed.
Growth Mid spend, rising Data use trending up, buying larger packs over time Upsell the next rung of the ladder before they find it themselves.
Price sensitive Low to mid Concentrated on promotional packs, switches on price Serve with targeted offers; never with an across-the-board price cut.
Heavy data Mid to high Consistently exhausts allowances, buys boosters Move onto a larger recurring plan — cheaper for them, steadier for the operator.
Entertainment & gaming Mid Skewed to streaming, social and gaming allowances Bundle content; this is where willingness to pay is least commoditised.
At risk Any Recharge frequency falling, days since last recharge rising Retention offer, sized by value at risk rather than by churn probability.
Dormant None currently Previously active, no revenue event in the last cycle Reactivation, and a decision on when to stop paying to keep the SIM alive.
Low value Bottom decile Minimal recharge, minimal usage, often a second SIM Serve digitally at near-zero cost. Do not spend retention budget here.

A segmentation earns its cost only if a different action follows from each segment. Two segments with the same action should be one segment.

Product lifecycle — the gates a pack should pass

01 Discovery A named customer need and the evidence it exists — a usage pattern, an unserved price point, a competitor gap. Requires: Usage data, portfolio gap analysis.
02 Business case Expected subscriptions × price × contribution margin, minus cannibalisation of existing packs. Signed off before build. Requires: Forecast take-up, source of switchers.
03 Launch Adoption against the business case in the first two cycles, and where the buyers came from. Requires: Daily activations, prior product held.
04 Growth Subscription growth, repeat purchase rate, and whether incremental revenue is holding up as the novelty fades. Requires: Repeat rate, cohort revenue.
05 Maturity Stable penetration. The question becomes price and margin, not volume. Requires: Contribution per subscription.
06 Decline Falling subscriptions or falling contribution. Distinguish the two: a shrinking product with rising margin may be fine. Requires: Trend in both volume and margin.
07 Retirement Consolidate into a neighbouring pack, migrate the base, and measure what was lost rather than assuming it transfers. Requires: Migration take-up, revenue retained.

The published catalogue shows several packs that a working version of this process would have caught: near-identical price and validity to a neighbouring pack, and per-gigabyte ladders that invert as duration rises. Portfolio simplification is on the opportunity list above for that reason.